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Abstract
The return from investments in public goods is almost always uncertain, in contrast
to the most common setup in the existing empirical literature. We study the impact of
natural uncertainty on cooperation in a social dilemma by conducting a public goods
experiment in the laboratory in which the marginal return to contributions is either
deterministic, risky (known probabilities) or ambiguous (unknown probabilities). Our
design allows us to make inferences on di↵erences in cooperative attitudes, beliefs, and
one-shot as well as repeated contributions to the public good under the three regimes.
Interestingly, we do not find that natural uncertainty has a significant impact on the
inclination to cooperate, neither on the beliefs of others nor on actual contribution de-
cisions. Our results support the generalizability of previous experimental results based
on deterministic settings. From a behavioural point of view, it appears that strategic
uncertainty overshadows natural uncertainty in social dilemmas.
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1 Introduction
Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas is a major research theme in the social
sciences in recent decades. Social dilemmas are characterized by individual incentives
to free ride on the cooperation of others at an e ciency cost to the whole group or
society. In economics, this type of situation has been studied experimentally by apply-
ing variants of the prisoner’s dilemma game and, more recently, the public goods game
(Chaudhuri, 2011). Almost the entire experimental literature assumes that benefits
from public goods, i.e. the return that cooperation yields to the group, are determin-
istic. Since the contributions of other group members are unknown in a simultaneous
setting, returns from public goods are usually characterized by strategic uncertainty.
However, the literature so far has neglected the uncertain nature of many public goods,
i.e. even when total contributions of other group members are known, the individual
and collective benefits from the public good may still be uncertain. In other words, the
returns from investing in a public good could be risky or truly uncertain (ambiguous).
For example, when countries invest in CO2 emission reduction, they have only a
vague idea about how their investment translates into the benefit of a more slowly
rising temperature on Earth1. When a team member invests e↵ort in joint production,
the benefit of one extra hour of work for the whole team might be uncertain. When
fishers limit their fishing activity to contribute to the replenishment of the stock in a
lake, they do not know how exactly this contribution converts into stock protection. In
short, although we know a lot about the strategic uncertainty in social dilemmas and
how it a↵ects the decision to contribute or not, we know almost nothing about how
people contribute under natural uncertainty.
Does natural uncertainty of the benefits in the provision of a public good increase or
decrease individual contributions? Does natural uncertainty interact with strategic un-
certainty? How does it a↵ect the e ciency of public good provision? We answer these
questions by implementing a laboratory experiment that draws on the linear voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM). We implement a standard version of the simultane-
ous VCM that is very close to the one used in Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010) and
1The Green Climate Fund was initiated at the 21st United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Paris 2015. The goal is to raise USD 100 billion per year by 2020. The funds will be used to assist
developing countries in mitigation and adaptation e↵orts to fight climate change (Green Climate Fund,
2014). Contributions to the fund are obviously characterized by a high degree of uncertainty; both
strategic in terms of the contribution decisions of others, and natural as the impact of the monetary
contributions on the intended purpose of combating climate change is truly uncertain.
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that allows us to compare our results directly with a large body of existing literature.
The experiment starts with a one-shot game that elicits unconditional and conditional
contributions (e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001, 2012; Kocher et al., 2008; Martinsson et
al., 2015). This provides us with a characterization of cooperating types and enables a
comparison of contributions in a situation that includes strategic uncertainty (i.e. the
unconditional simultaneous contribution decision) to contributions in a situation that
isolates strategic uncertainty (i.e. the conditional contribution schedule where others’
contributions are fixed). After the one-shot game, participants in the experiment play
a repeated game with a finite horizon, eliciting only unconditional contributions.
By introducing three between-subject conditions, we address our research questions
related to the impact of the natural uncertainty of the public good returns on contribu-
tion behaviour. Depending on the condition, the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
from investment in the public good is either (i) deterministic (CONTROL condition),
(ii) risky, with a 50% probability of being either low or high (RISK condition) or (iii)
ambiguous, with an Ellsberg urn (Ellsberg, 1961) determining whether the return is
high or low (AMBIGUITY condition)2. Regardless of the condition and the realization
of the MPCR in conditions (ii) and (iii), the contribution decision remains a social
dilemma, i.e. the MPCR is always set so that it is individually optimal to free ride
(to contribute nothing to the public good) for a money-maximizing decision maker,
regardless of risk/ambiguity attitude. For all conditions, it is ex-ante and ex-post so-
cially optimal to cooperate (to contribute the entire endowment), regardless of risk-
and ambiguity attitudes. In order to allow a direct comparison across conditions, the
deterministic MPCR is set to the expected value of the MPCR in the risky condition
and to the implied expectation in the ambiguous condition.
For what follows, it is helpful to clearly define terms: We use the term uncertainty
as an umbrella term for risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabil-
ities). Natural uncertainty refers to uncertainty implied by nature, whereas strategic
uncertainty means uncertainty that originates from the choice of other decision mak-
ers3. Natural uncertainty can stem from for example the nature of the public good
2It is a well-established fact that, for (implied) probabilities around 50%, decision makers in lottery
choices on average display an additional aversion against ambiguity, over and above the generally
observed risk aversion (Kocher et al., 2015a).
3There is evidence that individuals dislike risk originating from strategic interactions more than risk
that does not originate from deliberate (human) choices. In the literature, this disparity is referred
to as betrayal aversion (see e.g. Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008, 2010 and the
discussion in Section 2).
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returns, from conflicting pieces of information, from limited experience with a cer-
tain phenomenon and from a lack of understanding of the interplay between variables
a↵ecting an outcome.
While the early literature on decision making under uncertainty focused almost
exclusively on individual settings, there is a rapidly growing literature in behavioural
and experimental economics on the e↵ects of risk taking in settings that involve social
interaction, such as social comparison and peer e↵ects, and settings that involve risky
decision making for others4. However, the existing literature examining the e↵ects
of natural uncertainty on cooperation in social dilemmas or closely related setups is
very small (Berger and Hershey, 1994; Dickinson, 1998; Levati et al., 2009; Levati and
Morone, 2013; Dannenberg et al., 2015; Ko¨ke et al., 2015). We discuss the results and
experimental setups of these studies in detail in Section 2.
Our paper provides several innovations compared with the existing literature: First,
our design and results are directly comparable to a large literature of VCM games with
deterministic MPCRs. In contrast, however, most of the existing studies on natural un-
certainty and cooperation deviate from the VCM in several dimensions (for instance by
introducing thresholds, loss framing, etc.). Second, we can clearly distinguish between
strategic uncertainty and natural uncertainty and, further, assess the e↵ects of natural
uncertainty in situations that do and do not involve strategic uncertainty. Third, we
di↵erentiate between risk and ambiguity concerning the MPCR in the VCM. This is
an important distinction since ambiguity seems to better resemble the nature of the
uncertainty related to benefits from investments in most of the above-mentioned exam-
ples of social dilemmas outside the laboratory (Boucher and Bramoulle´, 2010; Millner
et al., 2013). Fourth, we can compare contribution behaviour in a one-shot respectively
a repeated setting using partner matching, which allows us to study the importance of
reputation building.
Our decision environment - the standard VCM, altered by the introduction of risky
or ambiguous benefits from the public good in the respective conditions - is set up such
that theoretical predictions are as straightforward as possible. As already mentioned,
free riders contribute nothing in all three conditions regardless of their risk/ambiguity
attitudes (see also Kocher et al., 2015b). This is not true for decisions makers with
social preferences as can be demonstrated by specifying a model with altruistic prefer-
4See e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010; Linde and Sonnemans, 2012; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen
et al., 2013; Ga¨chter et al., 2013; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015; Krawczyk and
Le Lec, 2016.
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ences implemented in the most parsimonious way possible. We show that depending
on the exact specification of risk preferences, reflected by the concavity of the utility
function, such a model renders two predictions; one where natural uncertainty with
respect to the benefits of contributions do not a↵ect decisions of neither risk-averse nor
ambiguity-averse decision makers, and one where risk- and ambiguity-averse decision
makers have a stronger inclination to contribute to the public good under uncertain
returns. These results follow from the linearity of our model; linear models of altruism
provide a cut-o↵ level of the altruism parameter that determines whether a decision
maker contributes nothing or her entire endowment to the public good. For certain
specifications, this cut-o↵ level is lowered for risk- and ambiguity-averse decision mak-
ers under uncertain public good returns, which leads to higher average contributions.
Evidently, the choice of model and specification is somewhat arbitrary which motivates
empirical results.
The results from our laboratory experiment, on a large sample, show that risky
and ambiguous benefits from the public good have only a very weak e↵ect on average
contribution levels. If anything, contributions are slightly lower under natural ambigu-
ity than under natural risk or a deterministic setting. Furthermore, we do not find an
interaction between strategic uncertainty and natural uncertainty. In summary, from
a behavioural point of view, it appears that strategic uncertainty overshadows natural
uncertainty in social dilemmas. We think that this is an informative and important
null result. Our findings are highly relevant from a methodological perspective as they
establish that results from experimental linear public goods with deterministic returns
translate to more realistic setups with uncertain benefits. Thus, it seems that it is
perfectly fine to abstract from uncertainty when studying social dilemmas as long as
it does not change the nature (Ko¨ke et al., 2015) or perception (e.g. Dannenberg et
al., 2015) of the game. We conclude that the usage of standard, more parsimonious
experimental designs is justified. Our results also have implications for the design of
mechanisms aimed at alleviating social dilemma situations outside the laboratory; since
natural uncertainty seems to play a less important role in determining decision-making
in social dilemmas that intuition would imply, we should probably direct e↵orts to-
wards designing mechanisms that reduce strategic uncertainty. However, if possible,
we should aim at designing more deterministic mechanisms of return to investment,
since - if at all - there is a tendency of less cooperation under uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a very brief overview
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of the relevant literature. In Section 3, we introduce the details of our experimental
design and derive theoretical predictions. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
For reasons of succinctness, we focus solely on experimental papers in economics that
deal with decision making under uncertainty in social interactions, with a particular
focus on natural uncertainty and social dilemmas.
That individuals, on average, contribute a significant share of their endowment to an
e ciency-enhancing public good despite the free-rider problem has become a stylized
fact (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007). Many of the models that have emerged to explain the
patterns of data involve other-regarding preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) and altruism (Anderson et al., 1998). The question of how natural
uncertainty influences pro-sociality has received increasing attention in recent years,
and the matter is far from resolved. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) analyse the impact
of natural and strategic uncertainty on individual willingness to take risk in trust
and dictator games in which the outcome for the recipient is determined by a chance
device. Their findings suggest that individuals are more likely to take risk in situations
where the risk is attributable to ‘nature’ rather than to the behaviour of another
player - a concept they refer to as betrayal aversion. Replicating the study in six
di↵erent countries, Bohnet et al. (2008) conclude that betrayal aversion seems to be a
robust finding across cultures. Building on these results, Bolton and Ockenfels (2010)
design a dictator game to investigate whether and how social comparisons influence
decisions in situations with natural risk. Their findings point in two directions: on
the one hand, subjects are more willing to take risks when another certain option
implies unequal payo↵s, which is in line with previous findings of inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999); on the other hand, subjects are more prone to choose an
outcome with a risky and socially unequal outcome than a certain outcome that implies
an equal distribution of resources, which goes against inequity aversion. The authors
argue that these contradictory findings could be a consequence of notions of procedural
fairness. When the social inequality can be attributed to the chance mechanism, which
is realized after the choice is made, it is less costly (in terms of utility) than when it is
directly attributed to the decision. Brock et al. (2013) use dictator games in which the
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probabilities of outcomes for both the dictator and the recipient vary, to explicitly study
whether decision makers care about the distribution of outcomes among players ex ante
(in expected values) or ex post the resolution of uncertainty. Their results indicate that,
on average, both considerations have positive weight in the decision function. However,
for the category of pro-social subjects, ex-ante comparisons are more important, and
the behaviour in standard dictator games is shown to be generalizable to risky dictator
games. The reported results from risky dictator games indicate that the exact way in
which ex ante and ex post concerns with respect to social equity enter the decision
function in risky situations remains unsettled (Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2016).
The impact of uncertainty on pro-social behaviour in settings that combine natural
and strategic uncertainty is discussed in a small but emerging literature on voluntary
contributions to public goods or to reduce risk. The few available studies do not give a
conclusive picture of the e↵ects of uncertainty on contributions or the potential mecha-
nisms that are driving the di↵erences in contributions. One issue that complicates the
reading is the variation in experimental design. The two most evident di↵erences are
whether contributions involve a binary or a more continuous choice set, and whether
the uncertainty of the payo↵s is conditioned on a threshold being reached (or avoided)
or on a chance mechanism that could either be independent of or positively related
to the sum of contributions to the public good. Since binary contributions might
frame a decision-making situation di↵erently than a more continuous choice set, and
threshold-structured public goods games change the set of Nash equilibria, it is di cult
to distinguish a general conclusion from the previous studies. In an attempt to sort
the literature, we begin by discussing studies looking at contributions as a device to
reduce or prevent risk, and then discuss studies of prisoner’s dilemma/public goods
contributions under uncertainty. Berger and Hershey (1994) investigate insurance be-
haviour in a repeated public goods game. Each player is exposed to a risk of incurring
a private loss of probability 1/n. In each round, players can decide to invest a fixed
amount in a collective insurance pool from which all losses, irrespective of whether the
player has contributed, are refunded. If the sum of losses exceeds the value of the in-
surance pool, subjects need to divide the additional cost among them. Compared with
a situation of certain losses, investment in the insurance pool was significantly lower
under risky losses. The authors reason that a combination of increased risk-seeking
preferences under stochastic returns and a feeling of less responsibility to cooperate
when losses can be attributed to ‘bad luck’ explain the results. A similar e↵ect on
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risk taking in the loss domain is found in a study by Suleiman et al. (1996), who
conduct a sequential common pool resource game where the uncertainty regarding the
resource size is determined by a draw from one of three di↵erent uniform distributions
of common knowledge to the subjects. They find that subjects tend to increase their
withdrawal of resources as the level of uncertainty regarding the size of the common
pool increases. The authors explain this result as a consequence of wishful thinking,
i.e. subjects base their estimate of the unknown resource on a weighted average of the
interval end points with a biased towards the larger value5.
In a recent study, Ko¨ke et al. (2015) examine protective and preventive behaviour
in an infinite horizon public goods game in which subjects face a binary decision of
whether to cooperate or defect to reduce the magnitude of a loss, or the probability of
losing the entire endowment. They find that subjects are more likely to cooperate and
to sustain cooperation when they can reduce the probability of experiencing a full loss
rather than marginally reduce the magnitude of the loss. Rather than risk aversion,
the authors attribute the results to a combination of anticipated regret aversion and
learning dynamics. They argue that subjects learn to defect more slowly when the
probability of a loss is reduced - a finding that has an optimistic flavour from the point
of view of sustained preventive actions to counter climate change.
Motivated by environmental problems and the ‘tipping-point’ properties of many
ecosystems, Dannenberg et al. (2015) study a ten-period repeated sequential threshold
public good game in groups of six players. Uncertainty is introduced on the threshold
level of contributions that has to be reached to avoid a catastrophic event that destroys
90% of the remaining individual endowment of each player. Players are informed about
13 potential threshold levels with either equal or unknown probability of realization,
depending on the treatment. Compared with a control treatment with a known thresh-
old level, risk and ambiguity have a negative e↵ect on the ability of groups to reach the
threshold. The result is largely driven by individual cooperative preferences. Condi-
tional cooperators are able to coordinate to reach the unknown threshold when enough
group members signal their willingness to contribute early on. Hence, the authors con-
clude that one mechanism to increase the level of cooperation under uncertainty is to
find ways to incentivize high initial contributions.
The relevance of loss aversion in explaining lower contributions in situations involv-
5In relation to this, it is interesting to note that Hsee and Weber (1997) find that individuals base
their predictions about others’ risk preferences on a weighted average of own risk preferences and risk
neutrality.
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ing uncertainty is examined by Levati and others in two studies. In the first, Levati et
al. (2009) implement a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with either low or high risky
marginal returns to contributions. The game is calibrated such that full contributions
are not socially beneficial when the low marginal return is realized. Compared with a
situation with certain marginal returns, the risky treatment significantly reduced av-
erage contributions. This result is completely driven by lower initial contributions as
the time trends of the contributions over the rest of the periods are similar in the two
treatments. Revisiting the setup, Levati and Morone (2013) modify the 2009 study by
calibrating marginal returns such that full contributions are socially e cient for both
realizations. They also add a treatment with ambiguous marginal returns. Now they
find no significant di↵erences in contribution behaviour in situations involving risky,
ambiguous or deterministic marginal returns of investment. The authors attribute
their previous findings of lower contributions under risk to loss aversion rather than
risk aversion6.
Lastly, Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) study a repeated linear public goods game
in a within-subject design and let groups of five players participate in seven treatments
in which the probability distributions of the private and public investments are either
certain, probabilistic or endogenously determined by the level of contributions. In the
control treatment, the MPCR is set to 0.3 and the private return to 1. The risky re-
alizations of the investment returns are determined by a known Bernoulli distribution
with expected values of 0.3 for public investments and 1 for private investments. In the
ambiguity treatments, the probability distribution of the realizations of the returns to
private and public investments is unknown. However, the authors allow participants
the choice to forgo 1/5 of their endowment to find out about the probability distribu-
tion in the ambiguity treatments7. This design makes it hard to determine the pure
e↵ect of ambiguity on contributions, since group members either know the probability
distribution or might suspect that other group members know it, which could a↵ect
6Similarly, Dickinson (1998) finds null results in a repeated public goods game with uncertainty on
the level of the MPCR. He employs a within-subject design, repeated public goods game in groups of
five to study how uncertainty regarding the MPCR influences contributions. The MPCR is known in
the first seven periods. In the subsequent seven periods, the returns are risky with a mean-preserving
spread resolved with the help of a bingo cage. In the last seven periods, the MPCR is set to zero with
a probability negatively correlated with the level of contributions to the group account. The order
of these two last conditions is altered between sessions. Dickinson finds no di↵erence in contribution
levels across the three within-subject treatments.
7This option is used by 43 % and 17 % of the subjects to find out about the probability distribution
of the returns to the private and public investments, respectively.
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their beliefs of others’ behaviour. The authors find that subjects invest less in the
account subject to uncertainty, regardless of whether it is private or public. However,
when the uncertainty is related to the public good, the combination of strategic and
natural uncertainty has an additional negative impact on contributions.
Of the existing studies, the experiments in Levati and Morone (2013) and Gan-
gadharan and Nemes (2009) are closest to ours, although there are several di↵erences.
Most importantly, in addition to the repeated game, we implement a one-shot decision,
which is more likely to detect potential di↵erences between deterministic and stochas-
tic MPCRs. In the repeated setting, reputation concerns are known to dominate other
behavioural motivations, and thus our design allows us to clearly distinguish between
strategic uncertainty and natural uncertainty. Further, we are able to see how uncer-
tainty of returns a↵ects the contribution decisions of di↵erent types of players, since
the contribution schedules from the preference elicitation in our experiment allows for
classification of behavioural types in terms of contribution patterns. We also measure
individual attitudes to risk and ambiguity. Finally, the relationship between strategic
and natural risk can be directly addressed in our experiment.
3 Experimental design and predictions
3.1 Predictions
We assume that decision makers have cooperative attitudes (preferences) determining
contribution strategies. In combination with the beliefs about the decisions of others
these strategies translate into actual contribution decisions. The conceptual frame-
work for this idea is based on Fosgaard et al. (2014). According to the framework,
the nature of the MPCR (deterministic versus uncertain) could a↵ect both individ-
ual cooperative attitudes (ai) and individual beliefs about others’ contributions (bi).
Contribution strategies in the one-shot preference elicitation task are only influenced
by attitudes, whereas the unconditional contribution decision ci is influenced by both
attitudes and beliefs, i.e. ci = ci(ai, bi) with ai, bi = ai, bi{D,R,A}, where D stands
for a deterministic MPCR, R for a risky MPCR and A for an ambiguous MPCR.
The conceptual framework does not provide us with directions of possible e↵ects of
uncertainty in the MPCR. Thus, we develop the following toy model, based on the most
parsimonious way of introducing pro-sociality and uncertainty in a utility model. We
assume a potentially non-linear utility function and incorporate a parameter capturing
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unconditional altruism or warm glow, i.e. the utility derived from giving to others,
as a linear component of the utility function (Anderson et al., 1998). The objective
function V of a risk-neutral player in the linear VCM can then be written as:
V (ci,RN) := (⇡i + ↵i
nX
i 6=j
⇡j) = w   ci +m
nX
j=1
cj + ↵i(
nX
i 6=j
w   cj +m
nX
k=1
ck), (1)
where ↵i   0 is an individual parameter determining the level of utility derived
from the sum of others’ profits and the subscript RN denotes risk neutrality of the
individual. Further, ⇡k = ⇡k{i, j} denotes the profit of player k; w the endowment; m
the MPCR, and n the number of group members. The maximization problem results
in the usual bang-bang solution following from the linearity of the problem:
ci,RN =
8<:full, if ↵i   1 mm(n 1)zero, if ↵i  1 mm(n 1) (2)
which has the following interpretation. For full contribution, the warm-glow param-
eter needs to be larger than the ratio of the individual marginal return to contributions
(1 m) and the marginal value to all other players (m(n  1)); otherwise the contribu-
tion is zero. Such cut-o↵ results of course represent a simplification. However, as can
be seen below, the obtained results can still be useful to get an impression of the direc-
tion of potential e↵ects. An important issue to keep in mind is the e↵ect of uncertainty
with respect to the MPCR on beliefs. While this is irrelevant for free riders, beliefs are
important for conditional cooperators. For them, introducing uncertainty could have
an additional e↵ect on beliefs, on top of the potential e↵ect on cooperative attitudes.
Our toy model cannot capture such positive influences on the beliefs (Chaudhuri, 2011;
Smith, 2012)8 , since the pro-social motive is assumed to be belief independent. We
also abstract from decision errors (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) and loss aversion in
order to keep the model tractable. Other potential extensions to the model include
non-linearity, a motivation to match the contribution of others, additional deviations
from the homo oeconomicus assumptions such as a specific form of bounded rationality.
To fix things, let us first assume that individuals exhibit constant relative risk
8 For a discussion about how beliefs seem to be game dependent through their connection to
preferences about reciprocity and guilt, see Fosgaard et al. (2014).
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aversion (CRRA) and that risk aversion applies only to utility derived from own profits
and not to utility from other-regarding concerns. Then, equation (1) becomes:
V (ci,RA1) :=
1
1  ri (⇡i)
1 ri + ↵i
nX
i 6=j
⇡j (3)
Now the threshold level of the warm-glow parameter for full contributions is strictly
smaller than that of a risk-neutral individual whenever ri < 1:
ci,RA1 =
8<:full, if ↵i  
1 m
⇡
ri
i m(n 1)
zero, if ↵i  1 m⇡rii m(n 1)
(4)
That is, as the utility from own monetary payo↵s is discounted for risk-averse indi-
viduals, the relative weight of the other-regarding component becomes larger. Hence,
the cut-o↵ level of the warm-glow parameter for contributions is lower than that for
a risk-neutral individual. This implies that average contribution levels to the public
good increase, ceteris paribus, the more risk averse individuals are. As an aside, note
that the belief regarding the level of risk attitudes of other group members should af-
fect unconditional contributions, but not conditional contributions. A straightforward
extension of the model shows that if a risk-averse, conditionally cooperative player
assumes that another player is risk neutral, she should adjust the belief and contribute
less than when facing another risk-averse player in her group. The second option is to
consider risk aversion over the entire utility function, i.e.:
V (ci,RA2) :=
1
1  ri (⇡i + ↵i
nX
i 6=j
⇡j)
1 ri (5)
The solution shows that the threshold level for ↵i coincides with that for a risk-
neutral individual for any level of risk attitude (as the parentheses (⇡i+↵i
Pn
i 6=j ⇡j)
 ri
cancel out). Hence, risk attitudes do not change the cut-o↵ value.
To summarize, cooperative attitudes of risk-averse individuals in a social dilemma,
with other-regarding preferences entering linearly into their utility functions, are either
una↵ected or reinforced by uncertainty depending on the way in which risk aversion
enters their utility functions. A very similar logic applies to ambiguity attitudes if we
assume that ambiguity aversion can be represented by a smooth function (Klibano↵ et
al., 2005). Ambiguity aversion will in this case add additional concavity to the utility
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function and, thus, intensify the e↵ect of risk aversion whenever there is an e↵ect on
the cut-o↵ level for cooperation.
We formulate our hypotheses in relation to the conceptual model (Figure 1). Given
the theoretical results, and bearing in mind that the model choice is somewhat arbitrary
and that empirical assessments seem desirable in order to establish stylized facts, our
hypotheses stipulate null e↵ects. All hypotheses are formulated as a comparison to a
case with deterministic MPCR and assume that the MPCR remains in the range that
implies a social dilemma.
Figure 1: Conceptual framework. The abbreviations H1 - H5 represent our
testable hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Cooperative attitudes are not a↵ected by natural uncertainty over
the MPCR.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The distribution of contribution types remains una↵ected by natural
uncertainty over the MPCR.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Beliefs about other group members’ mean contribution levels are
not di↵erent under natural uncertainty over the MPCR.
HYPOTHESIS 4: The relative impact of attitudes and beliefs about contributions is
una↵ected by natural uncertainty over the MPCR.
HYPOTHESIS 5: Contribution behaviour is not di↵erent under natural uncertainty
over the MPCR.
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3.2 Experimental design
Our experiment implements three conditions in a between-subject design: CONTROL,
RISK and AMBIGUITY. Each session was divided into three parts as summarized in
Table 1. Our basic experimental setting is a public goods game with a linear payo↵
function (i.e. a VCM) played in groups of four. All players played two versions of this
game: a one-shot game (Part 1) in order to elicit cooperative attitudes, beliefs and
unconditional contributions, followed by a 10-period repeated game (Part 2) in order
to elicit cooperative behaviour in a repeated setting. Participants were informed in the
initial instructions that the experiment consisted of three parts. The instructions for
each part were distributed and read out loud prior to the start of the respective part
(see Appendix II).
In Part 1, we followed the design by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and conducted a one-
shot public goods game with elicitation of an unconditional contribution and a vector of
conditional contributions (aka a contribution table). At the end of Part 1, without any
knowledge of the outcomes, subjects were asked for their beliefs regarding the average
contribution of their group members in the one-shot game. They were incentivized
as in Ga¨chter and Renner (2010)9. All contribution decisions were incentivized as
described in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and clearly described to the participants, using
a random mechanism that made the conditional contribution payo↵-relevant for one
group member and the unconditional contribution payo↵-relevant for the remaining
group member. The amounts were denoted in experimental currency units (ECU),
where 1 ECU = 0.10 in Part 1. The final payo↵s for Part 1 were not announced until
the end of Part 3. Thus, the participants did not know how much the other group
members had contributed to the public good in Part 1.
In Part 2, participants were randomly assigned to a new group of four members with
whom they had previously not interacted, and played a repeated linear public goods
game for ten periods in fixed groups. After each period, players received feedback on
the contributions of the other group members, the total contribution to the public good
and the payo↵ of each group member including themselves. Subjects were informed
that all ten periods were payo↵-relevant, and the exchange rate was set to 1 ECU=
9If the guess was within 0.5 points of the actual average contribution, the subjects earned an
amount equal to half of the endowment. If the guess was further o↵ than 0.5 points, they earned
a fourth of the endowment divided by the (absolute) distance between the guess and the actual
average contribution. This task was not included in the instructions, i.e. it came as a surprise to the
participants. A screenshot of the belief elicitation is included in Appendix I, Figure 6
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0.04.
Both in Part 1 and in each period in Part 2, each subject was endowed with 20
tokens and could choose how much of the endowment to contribute, ci, to the public
good while keeping the rest in an individual account10. Thus, the individual profit
from the decision in every round was determined by:
⇡i = (20  ci) +mT
4X
j=1
cj (6)
where the public good is represented by the sum of all four group members’ contri-
butions;
P4
j=1 cj . The MPCR, mT , was fixed at mT = 0.6 in CONTROL and either
high (mT = 0.9) or low (mT = 0.3) in the RISK and AMBIGUITY conditions, respec-
tively. Each subject experienced only one of the three conditions. The MPCR in the
two uncertainty conditions was realized at the end of each period with the condition-
specific distribution of probabilities. By setting the probability of the high and the
low MPCR to 50%, the expected MPCR in the risk condition equals 0.6, which is
exactly the same as in CONTROL. The levels of mT were calibrated such that the
social dilemma structure of the game was kept, i.e. mT < 1 and nmT > 1, while at
the same time maximizing the distance between the high and low realizations. In ef-
fect, this calibration ensures a Nash equilibrium of zero contributions for a (monetary)
payo↵-maximizing individual, since mT < 1. Also, the social optimum of contributing
the entire endowment remains unaltered across conditions because nmT > 1. The
marginal returns were determined through a ‘chips-drawing’ procedure introduced to
the participants at the beginning of the first public goods game.
In the RISK condition, one opaque bag was filled with 100 chips (50 yellow and
50 white) in front of the participants at the beginning of Part 1. The realization of
mR was implemented by randomly selecting one participant who publicly drew one
coloured chip, with replacement, for each group in the sessions. If the colour of the
drawn chip matched the colour picked by the experimenters prior to the session and
written down on a piece of paper placed in a closed envelope, mR was set to 0.9 for
that group. If the colours did not match, mR was set to 0.3. At the beginning of Part
2, ten bags were filled in front of the subjects (one for each period of the game), and
10Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010) did not find evidence of order e↵ects in an experimental setup
very similar to ours. Hence, since no feedback was provided between Parts 1 and 2, we do not expect
any order e↵ects between these parts.
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the realization of mR took place at the end of each period in the same way as in Part
1. Hence, during Part 2 participants knew the realizations after each period.
In the AMBIGUITY condition, prior to Part 1, subjects were asked to choose a
‘decision colour’, either yellow or white. The realization of mA was implemented in a
similar manner as described for the RISK condition. Instead of filling the bags in front
of the participants, they were instructed that the bags had been filled beforehand with
100 chips from a large pool of chips containing an unknown distribution of yellow and
white chips (we followed the procedure of Kocher et al., 2015; reasons for the specific
setup are discussed there). If the colour of the drawn chip matched the colour chosen
by a majority11 of the group, mA was set to 0.9 for that group; otherwise mA was set
to 0.3. In Part 2, subjects were shu✏ed into new groups and the majority colour was
determined anew, based on the group members’ initial choice of decision colour and
the majority of the group. In both uncertainty conditions, subjects were invited to
inspect the content of the bags at the end of the experiment.
Table 1: Overview of the experimental design
Condition
CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY
Part I: Public goods game - mCONTROL = 0.6 mRISK = 0.3; p = 50% mAMBIGUITY = 0.3; unknown p
One shot mRISK = 0.9; p = 50% mAMBIGUITY = 0.9; unknown p
Unconditional contrib.
Conditional contrib. n ⇤mCONTROL = 2.4 n ⇤mRISK = 1.2; p = 50% 1.2  n ⇤mAMBIGUITY  3.6
Beliefs n ⇤mRISK = 3.6; p = 50%
Part II: Public goods game - mCONTROL = 0.6 mRISK = 0.3; p = 50% mAMBIGUITY = 0.3; unknown p
Ten periods mRISK = 0.9; p = 50% mAMBIGUITY = 0.9; unknown p
Unconditional contrib.
n ⇤mCONTROL = 2.4 n ⇤mRISK = 1.2; p = 50% 1.2  n ⇤mAMBIGUITY  3.6
n ⇤mRISK = 3.6; p = 50%
Part III: Lottery
Risk attitudes 50 red, 50 blue chips 50 red, 50 blue chips 50 red, 50 blue chips
Ambiguity attitudes 100 chips; red or blue 100 chips; red or blue 100 chips; red or blue
Number of observations 60 60 60
11In the case of a tie, the majority colour was determined by a random draw.
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Part 3 consisted of multiple choice lists to elicit attitudes to risk and ambiguity,
following the design by Sutter et al. (2010). All amounts were expressed in euros (see
Appendix II for an example of the lists). Participants completed a series of ordered
choices on whether to take a safe or an uncertain payo↵. In the first 20 choice problems,
attitudes to risk were elicited. The safe payo↵ was increased in increments of 0.5 from
0 to 10 and the risky payo↵ was either 10 or 0, each with a probability of 50%.
The second set of 20 decisions focused on attitudes to ambiguity. The safe payo↵ was
identical to the first 20 choices, and the ambiguous payo↵ was either 10 or 0, each
with an unknown probability. The payo↵-relevant choice was determined by letting one
randomly chosen participant draw a card form a deck of 40 cards, which represented the
40 decisions made. If the number of the card corresponded to a risky choice (1-20), the
participant drew one chip from a bag filled with 50 red and 50 blue chips in front of all
participants. If the number of the card corresponded to an ambiguous choice (21-40),
the participant drew a chip from a bag with an unknown distribution of red and blue
chips, filled as the bags in Parts 1 and 2 described for the AMBIGUITY treatment. The
payo↵ from the risky/ambiguous choice was set to 10 if the colour drawn matched the
colour chosen by the participant prior to Part 3, and to 0 otherwise. For participants
who had chosen the safe amount in the choice problem determined by the card, the
safe amount was paid out regardless of the colour drawn. It should be noted that we
cannot exclude order e↵ects from Part 2 to Part 3 due to the feedback information, in
particular on profits in Part 2. Thus, the elicitation of uncertainty attitudes in Part
3 provides auxiliary data that do not a↵ect our condition comparisons. Given this,
our test of equality in uncertainty attitudes across conditions is a demanding test of
successful randomization.
4 Empirical analysis and results
The experiment was carried out in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of
Munich, Germany, and programmed using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
One hundred eighty participants were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from
the laboratory’s subject pool. In total, nine experimental sessions were run with 20
participants in each session. The sample was similar in socio-economic characteristics
such as gender (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.80) and academic field ( 2 test, p=0.10)
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when comparing across the three treatments 12. The experiment lasted 1.5 - 2 hours,
depending on the condition. The average payo↵ was 24 ( 23.4 in CONTROL, 24
in RISK and 24.4 in AMBIGUITY). The earnings were paid privately in cash at the
end of the session together with a show-up fee of 4.
The risk attitude elicitation task in Part 3 of our experiment allows us to deter-
mine individual attitudes to risk and ambiguity. We find no significant di↵erences
across conditions when looking at the number of risky and ambiguous choices in a
Mann-Whitney test (risk attitudes in Part 3: CONTROL=RISK: p=0.136; CON-
TROL=AMBIGUITY: p=0.679; RISK=AMBIGUITY: p=0.299; ambiguity attitudes
in Part 3: CONTROL=RISK: p=0.530; CONTROL=AMBIGUITY: p=0.920; RISK=
AMBIGUITY: p=0.679)13, which we take as evidence that our randomization worked.
4.1 Cooperative attitudes
The conditional contribution schedules from Part 1 allow us to elicit cooperative atti-
tudes. By conditioning decisions on other group members’ average contributions, the
decision becomes (from a game-theoretic perspective) sequential and does not exhibit
any strategic uncertainty. Do contribution schedules di↵er across our three treatments,
which feature di↵erent types of natural uncertainty? A quick glance on figure 2 indi-
cates that there are very small di↵erences between the treatments.
12All tests throughout the paper are two-sided.
13We find similar results when using the switching point as a proxy for risk and ambiguity attitudes,
respectively. The great majority of our subjects are consistent in their choices. 100%, 96.6% and 95%
of those in the CONTROL, RISK and AMBIGUITY treatments, respectively, show consistent choice
behaviour in the risk attitudes elicitation in terms of a maximum of one switching point in the direction
risky-to-safe. The corresponding numbers for the ambiguity attitudes elicitation are 98%, 97% and
93%.
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Figure 2: Average conditional contribution schedule
In a more detailed analysis of the conditional contribution patterns, we investigate
individual heterogeneity. Following Fischbacher and Ga¨chter and Renner (2010), we
fit a linear regression for each individual. We can then compare di↵erent attitudes by
plotting the relation between the individual slope coe cient (x-axis), which shows how
much an individual increases her contribution if the others on average increase theirs
by one unit, and the average individual contribution in the schedule (y-axis), repre-
sented by a circle (Figure 3). The circles are scaled such that a larger size represents
higher relative frequency of the average individual contribution. It is useful to use
perfectly conditional cooperators (people who match the others’ average contributions
perfectly for all levels) and free riders as reference points when interpreting the figures.
A perfect conditional cooperator will have a mean contribution level of 10 and a slope
of 1. For a free rider, both the mean contribution and the slope will be zero. Most
subjects have positive slopes, meaning that they increase their contributions as the
group’s average contribution increases. Although there is considerable heterogeneity
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in cooperative attitudes within our three treatments, there are no significant di↵er-
ences across conditions (F-test, p=0.7983)14. This can also be seen more clearly when
combining the fitted slopes, which relate the individual slopes from the contribution
schedules to the individual average contributions in the contribution table, into one
graph (Figure 3, bottom right).
Figure 3: Heterogeneous contribution attitudes
RESULT 1: Cooperative attitudes are not a↵ected by natural uncer-
tainty.
Findings from numerous replications of the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design are
conclusive in that attitudes to cooperation di↵er across individuals. The most com-
mon categorization, based on the full contribution schedules, is to form four types of
14Nor is there any statistical di↵erence in terms of purely altruistic contributions, defined as pos-
itive contributions conditional on the average contribution in the group being zero (Mann-Whitney
tests: CONTROL=RISK, p=0.229; CONTROL=AMBIGUITY, p=0.674; RISK=AMBIGUITY,
p= 0.424; proportion test: CONTROL=RISK, p=0.207; CONTROL=AMBIGUITY, p=0.658;
RISK=AMBIGUITY, p= 0.408).
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groups. Free riders are the subjects who never contribute anything, irrespective of
the contributions of others. Conditional cooperators are subjects whose contributions
monotonically increase with the average contribution of the other group members, or
for whom the Spearman rank correlation coe cient between own and others’ contri-
butions is positive and significant at the 1% level. Hump-shaped is the term for those
who increase their contributions up to a certain point, after which they decrease their
contributions (creating a ‘hump’ in the contribution schedule). Finally, the remaining
subjects are classified as others.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of types. By far, conditional cooperators are the
most frequent type in all conditions: 82% in CONTROL, 72% in RISK and 70% in
AMBIGUITY. Overall, the frequency of contribution types does not di↵er statisti-
cally across conditions (Pearson’s  2: p=0.551; Fisher’s exact test: p=0.574). The
conditional contribution schedules of the di↵erent types are also similar in the three
treatments (see Appendix I, Figure A1). The distribution of types is consistent with
previous findings in the literature (Chaudhuri, 2011).
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Figure 4: Distribution of contributor types
RESULT 2: The distribution of contribution types is una↵ected by
natural uncertainty.
4.2 Beliefs
Are beliefs in the RISK and AMBIGUITY conditions di↵erent from those in the
CONTROL condition? Overall, subjects do extremely well in guessing the average
contribution of their group members in all three conditions. We find no significant
di↵erence between the average one-shot contributions in Part 1 and the average be-
liefs about group members’ mean contributions, as shown in Table 2. Average be-
liefs are somewhat lower in both uncertainty conditions, and so is the average con-
tribution in the one-shot public goods game in Part 1. Particularly, when looking
at the cumulative distribution of beliefs (Appendix I, Figure A4), it seems that a
higher share of participants in the RISK and AMBIGUITY conditions believe that
the other group members’ contributions are low: 75% and 72%, respectively, of the
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Table 2: Mean beliefs and unconditional contributions (std. dev in brackets)
Belief Contribution H0: Belief=Contribution
(one-shot) Wilcoxon signed-ranks test
CONTROL 9.25 9.42 p=0.97
(4.47) (6.42)
RISK 8.57 7.87 p=0.39
(3.40) (5.96)
AMBIGUITY 8.09 8.12 p=0.90
(5.02) (6.90)
Mann-Whitney U-test
H0: CONTROL=RISK p=0.57 p=0.21
H0: CONTROL=AMBIGUITY p=0.15 p=0.21
H0: RISK=AMBIGUITY p=0.36 p=0.92
subjects believe that the average contribution is 10 or less; the corresponding number
in the CONTROL condition is 65%. However, the di↵erence in belief distribution is
too small to be significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: CONTROL=RISK, p=0.660; CON-
TROL=AMBIGUITY, p=0.660; RISK=AMBIGUITY, p= 0.509). Our null result also
holds if we break down the analysis into types (see Appendix I, Table A1). Although
there are indications of lower beliefs in the uncertainty conditions, we cannot reject
our null hypothesis of equal beliefs across conditions.
RESULT 3: There are no di↵erences in beliefs about other group mem-
bers’ mean contribution levels under natural uncertainty, compared with
the deterministic situation.
4.3 E↵ect of attitudes and beliefs on contributions
Table 2 reveals that one-shot unconditional contributions are not significantly di↵erent
from each other in the three treatments using pairwise tests. If at all, average contri-
butions to the public good are lower in RISK and AMBIGUITY than in CONTROL
(in contrast to both theoretical utility specifications put forward in Section 3), even
though the di↵erences fail by far to reach conventional levels of significance in pairwise
tests. Remember that we have a comparatively large sample (N=60) and that all ab-
solute di↵erences are small in economic terms. Section 4.5 provides some additional
power analyses for our main results.
The elicitation of beliefs in Part 1, together with the unconditional and conditional
22
contributions, allows us to analyse how beliefs relate to actual average contribution
decisions at the individual level. We use the belief from Part 1 and the respective
conditional contribution from the contribution schedule in Part 1 to see how they can
explain the unconditional contributions from Part 1.
Following Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010), we predict the unconditional contribu-
tion, cˆi as: cˆi = ai(bi). That is, we take the belief of a subject, look up her conditional
contribution for the specific belief and see how the ‘predicted unconditional contribu-
tion’ matches the actual unconditional contribution in Part 1. If we define subjects
who deviate within two units from the predicted contributions as consistent, as in
Ga¨chter et al. (2014), we have 50% consistent decision makers in CONTROL, 65% in
RISK and 58% in AMBIGUITY (Pearson  2 : p = 0.414; Fischer’s exact: p=0.452,
for the comparison across treatments), which is similar to the finding in Ga¨chter et
al. (2014), where 64% are classified as consistent. Moreover, on average there are
no significant di↵erences across treatments in terms of the magnitude of deviations
from the predicted contribution (Mann-Whitney test; CONTROL=RISK: p=0.438;
CONTROL=AMBIGUITY: p=0.197; RISK=AMBIGUITY: p=0.533).
The next step is to explain the impact of attitudes and beliefs on unconditional
contributions. We use OLS to run a regression of contributions as a function of beliefs
and predicted contributions:
ci = ↵ +  cˆi +  bi + ✏i (7)
The predicted contribution captures how well beliefs about others’ behaviour cor-
relate with attitudes to cooperation. If attitude is the only thing that matters for
decisions, the coe cient of cˆi should be 1, i.e.   = 1. If both attitudes and beliefs
matter, and there is nothing else explaining contribution behaviour, the sum of their co-
e cients should be 1, i.e.  +   = 1, assuming no problem related to multi-collinearity
between attitudes and beliefs (see further Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010, footnote 17).
The regression results are presented in Table 3. Panel A includes the whole sample
of subjects, whereas panel B is restricted to subjects categorized as conditional cooper-
ators. The sample is restricted to conditional cooperators because beliefs are expected
not to a↵ect the behaviour of free riders, while they play the most important role for
conditional cooperators. For both panels, we estimate one regression per treatment
in order to simplify readability compared with a regression with interaction e↵ects of
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the main variables with the treatment dummies. Consistent with previous findings
(Ga¨chter et al., 2014; Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010), both beliefs and predicted contri-
butions are positive and significant in explaining the first period contribution in both
panels. The F-test in Table 3 shows that the sum of the coe cients is not statistically
di↵erent from one in either of the conditions. This implies that the magnitude of the
coe cients is similar across the three treatments. Table A3 in Appendix I introduces
the independent variables separately to give an indication of possible multi-collinearity.
Our conclusions remain unchanged.
Looking at the whole sample (Panel A), the regression results indicate that be-
liefs are playing the most important role in explaining contributions in all conditions,
particularly so in the RISK condition. This result is further supported when looking
at the R2 in the regression in the Appendix, which uses only one of the independent
variables at a time. F-tests on the equality of the coe cients reveal no significant
di↵erence across the three treatments. Note, however, that in the RISK treatment, the
influence of the beliefs on cooperation is on average a bit higher than in the two other
treatments.
RESULT 4: The relative impact of attitudes and beliefs on contribu-
tions is una↵ected by natural uncertainty.
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Table 3: The explanatory power of attitudes and beliefs for first period
contribution decisions
CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
cˆ 0.455*** 0.398*** 0.437** 0.537*** 0.440** 0.426*
(0.136) (0.116) (0.175) (0.158) (0.167) (0.232)
Belief 0.554*** 0.763*** 0.577** 0.393* 0.629** 0.522*
(0.201) (0.158) (0.231) (0.225) (0.253) (0.297)
Constant 0.965 -1.161 0.571 2.512* -0.0587 1.829
(1.254) (1.129) (1.121) (1.377) (1.573) (1.501)
F-test: cˆ+Belief = 1 p=0.933 p=0.181 p=0.899 p=0.559 p=0.681 p=0.703
F-test: cˆ = Belief p= 0.761 p=0.150 p=0.725 p=0.700 p=0.634 p=0.854
Observations 60 60 60 49 43 42
R2 0.672 0.641 0.665 0.687 0.576 0.618
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.4 Repeated contributions
Our findings indicate that outcome uncertainty does not significantly change the rel-
ative importance of beliefs and attitudes for contribution decisions. However, in a
repeated setting other factors such as learning, reputational concerns and dynamics in
the beliefs might play an important role. It these factors play a di↵erent role when
interacted with natural uncertainty, contribution behaviour could change. We thus
conclude our empirical assessment by looking at Part 2 of the experiment, i.e. the
10-period repeated VCM in fixed groups.
In Figure 5 we average over group contributions for each period and condition.
Indeed, the contribution levels in the AMBIGUITY condition seem to be somewhat
lower until period 7. However, the di↵erence in absolute levels is small and the mean
level of group contributions over all ten periods does not di↵er significantly across the
three treatments (Kruskal-Wallis text, p=0.392).
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Figure 5: Repeated contributions across conditions
Going beyond the non-parametric comparison, we look at an individual random-
e↵ect panel regression that can take the dynamics of contributions into account. The
most parsimonious way of looking at individual contributions is to model them as a
function of the treatment and a time trend.
We also modify our base model by adding the positive and negative deviations
in own contributions from the average contribution of the other group members in
the previous period, cdevPosi,t 1 and c
devNeg
i,t 1 , respectively, and a dummy, HighMPCRi,t 1,
indicating whether the realization of the MPCR was high or low in the previous period,
as well as the interactions
P
I. The econometric specification is:
cit = ↵ +  RISKRISK +  AMBIGUITYAMBIGUITY +  1c
devPos
i,t 1 +  2c
devNeg
i,t 1 +
 3HighMPCRi,t 1 +  0Period+
X
I + ✏it
(8)
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The deviations from group members’ previous decisions are introduced to capture
the dynamics within the group. For conditional cooperators, the contributions of others
relative to their own contributions matter by definition. The dummy for the realization
of the previous period’s marginal per capita return is introduced to get a grasp of
whether individuals adhere to simplifying decision heuristics (gambler’s fallacy or hot
hand fallacy) and how this di↵ers between risk and ambiguity. In e↵ect, the realization
of the marginal per capita return is independent across periods. Nevertheless, the latest
realization might be used, deliberately or subconsciously, as some sort of guide for the
next decision. We run the model as a pooled OLS with errors, ✏it, clustered at the
group level15. As a robustness check we also run a random e↵ects Tobit model where
the contributions are censored at 0 (lower limit) and 20 (upper limit). Such censoring is
ignored in an OLS framework, which might lead to inconsistent and downward-biased
estimates (Merrett, 2012). The results do not a↵ect the interpretations of the e↵ects
at play (results in Appendix 1, Table A4).
15We tested whether we could use GLS. However, a Hausman test applied to the base model
suggested choosing a fixed e↵ects specification above a random e↵ect ( 2 = 16.46, P ¡ 0.001). As
we want to capture time-invariant explanatory variables, we specified a pooled OLS with clustered
standard errors at the group level.
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Table 4: Regression results from pooled OLS for individual contribution
decisions
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
RISK 0.645 1.406 Reference
(1.726) (2.613)
AMBIGUITY -1.443 -0.851 -2.249
(2.033) (2.914) (2.655)
cdevPosi,t 1 0.0909 -0.0513
(0.206) (0.200)
cdevPosi,t 1 ⇤RISK -0.213 Reference
(0.251)
cdevPosi,t 1 ⇤AMBIGUITY -0.0876 0.225
(0.285) (0.292)
cdevNegi,t 1 -0.430** -0.499**
(0.201) (0.232)
cdevNegi,t 1 ⇤RISK -0.102 Reference
(0.283)
cdevNegi,t 1 ⇤AMBIGUITY -0.241 -0.0245
(0.291) (0.317)
HighMPCRi,t 1 0.956
(0.889)
HighMPCRi,t 1 ⇤AMBIGUITY -0.139
(2.045)
HighMPCRi,t 1 ⇤ cdevNegi,t 1 -0.0689
(0.196)
HighMPCRi,t 1 ⇤ cdevNegi,t 1 ⇤AMBIGUITY -0.254
(0.333)
HighMPCRi,t 1 ⇤ cdevPosi,t 1 -0.161
(0.208)
HighMPCRi,t 1 ⇤ cdevPos(i,t 1 ⇤AMBIGUITY -0.198
(0.313)
Constant 10.48*** 12.53*** 13.31***
(1.214) (2.237) (1.649)
Period FE
Observations 1,800 1,620 1,080
R-squared 0.047 0.111 0.111
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The results from our most basic model (Table 4) confirm the impression from Figure
2. Average contributions are lower in the AMBIGUITY condition and higher in the
RISK condition. However, the dummy variables for the conditions are not significant.
When adding deviations from group members’ average contributions in the previous
period, and their interaction with the condition dummies (Table 4, Column (2)), we
find not surprisingly that subjects respond the most to negative deviations. A one-
unit increase in the average negative deviation is matched with a -0.43 contribution
response, irrespective of condition. In other words, the large share of conditional
cooperators identified in Part 1 base their contribution decisions on the other group
members’ previous contributions. However, their reactions are stronger to negative
than to positive deviations.
The results hold when we introduce dummies for the realization of the high MPCR
level in the previous period (Column (3)). To this end, we run a regression using only
the observations from the AMBIGUITY condition, using RISK as reference condition.
The results do not provide any support for subjects using last period’s realization as
a simplifying heuristic for the current period’s contribution decision. This finding is
interesting in light of the findings in Ko¨ke et al. (2015), where the experience of a
loss event triggered people to start cooperating in the next period despite the fact that
realizations of losses were independent.
RESULT 5: There is no di↵erence in contribution behaviour to a public
good over time under natural uncertainty, compared with a deterministic
situation.
4.5 Power test
This paper provides a set of null results. We believe that they are informative, since
the theoretical priors are unclear. However, null results need to rely on su cient
sample sizes. We have 60 independent observations for each treatment in Part 1 of
the experiment. This is a comparatively high number for experimental public goods
games, yet a more formal assessment of the robustness of our results with regard to
sample size is desirable. Since the non-existence of comparable results made an a priori
test plan unobtainable, we look at an ex-post assessment of statistical power. Table
5 shows the number of independent observations required per treatment to reach a
significance level of p=0.05 in a two-sided test of independent means (based on the
values in Table 2). We use the observed means and variances as well as a test power
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of 0.8, i.e. an 80 % chance to distinguish an e↵ect size from pure randomness. The
results show that our null results are very robust and that the sample size would have
to be much higher to come close to significant di↵erences between the treatments. In
any respect, the economic magnitudes of the di↵erences are very small.
Table 5: Power test indicating N for each treatment to reach p=0.05
Belief Contribution
CONTROL and RISK N=536 N=251
CONTROL and AMBIGUITY N=264 N=413
RISK and AMBIGUITY N=1253 N=10440
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to investigate the e↵ect of uncertainty regarding the
MPCR on contributions to public goods. Many, if not most, real-life public goods have
the feature that the relationship between contributions to and the return from the pub-
lic good is uncertain. Meanwhile, most knowledge about cooperative behaviour from
public goods experiments conducted in the laboratory is based on purely deterministic
returns. By conducting both a one-shot public goods experiment using the strategy
method and a 10-period public goods experiment with deterministic, risky and am-
biguous return conditions in a between-subject design, we can separate the e↵ect of
natural and strategic uncertainty. Our main finding is that the standard results with
deterministic return hold in the presence of uncertainty.
We do not observe significant di↵erences between the three treatments CONTROL,
RISK and AMBIGUITY. These null results hold for cooperative attitudes (contribu-
tion schedules), beliefs, one-shot contributions, the type distribution and the repeated
interaction. While null results are often considered less interesting in economics, we
think that we provide a very relevant null result here. First, theoretical predictions
are ambiguous and do not give clear guidance regarding what to expect. Second, our
null result holds consistently in related domains (attitudes, beliefs and contributions)
and thus seems systematic rather than idiosyncratic. Third, our power analysis shows
30
convincingly that the null results are robust to a strong increase in sample size, despite
the fact that we already use a comparatively large sample in our experiment. Hence,
we believe that we provide a very informative null result in the domain of research on
social dilemmas.
Our results lend themselves to some relevant methodological implications and to
apparent implications for the world outside the laboratory. It seems that existing
empirical evidence based on deterministic public goods games can be taken as good
indicators for situations outside the laboratory that involve natural uncertainty. Hence,
the existing research has not neglected an important dimension in the provision of
public goods so far. Our findings also have more general implications for uncertainty
in the provision of public goods. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that
strategic uncertainty overshadows natural uncertainty in social dilemmas and that
the focus when designing cooperation-enhancing mechanisms should be on reducing
strategic uncertainty rather than natural uncertainty. Given that the latter is often
not possible by the very nature of the problem, this is good news for the solving of
real-world social dilemmas. A natural extension of our research is to study the external
validity of our main findings directly in the field, but this will be left for future research.
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Appendix I
Table A1: Summary statistics of unconditional contribution, conditional
contribution and belief by type
Average conditional contribution Pairwise Mann-Whitney
Type CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY A=C R=C A=R
Conditional cooperator 7.60 7.72 7.91 p=0.187 p=0.526 p=0.482
(6.69) (6.46) (6.53)
Free rider 0 0 0 - - -
Hump-shaped 4.92 4.59 6.21 p=0.046 p=0.795 p=0.089
(5.43) (4.29) (5.31)
Other 6.52 7.13 6.51 p=0.278 p=0.914 p=0.505
(3.76) (5.86) (5.44)
Beliefs Pairwise Mann-Whitney
Type CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY A=C R=C A=R
Conditional cooperator 9.71 8.55 9.06 p=0.449 p=0.333 p=0.905
(4.65) (3.43) (5.31)
Free rider 6.5 6.5 3.75 p=0.225 p=0.634 p=0.520
(3.11) (6.02) (2.17)
Hump-shaped 7.25 6.5 6.42 p=0.592 p=0.593 p=0.999
(3.80) (4.09) (3.67)
Other 8 11.64 9 p=0.697 p=0.059 p=0.181
(1.73) (3.84) (2.82)
Unconditional contribution Pairwise Mann-Whitney
Type CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY A=C R=C A=R
Conditional cooperator 10.51 8.56 9.88 p=0.572 p=0.169 p=0.510
(6.31) (5.50) (7.02)
Free rider 2.5 2.86 0.5 p=0.514 p=0.773 p=0.845
(5) (7.56) (1.41)
Hump-shaped 5.75 4.66 6 p=0.828 p=0.589 p=0.513
(5.56) (4.04) (5.83)
Other 5.67 10 8.25 p=0.138 p=0.190 p=0.848
(1.15) (5.60) (2.36)
A1-1
Figure A1: Conditional contribution across types
Figure A2: Distribution of certainty equivalents in the risk attitudes elicitation
across treatments
A1-2
Figure A3: Distribution of certainty equivalents in the ambiguity attitudes
elicitation across treatments
Table A2: Switching points
CONTROL RISK AMBIGUITY
Number of switches Ambiguity Risk Ambiguity Risk Ambiguity Risk
0 2 2 1 1
1 59 60 56 56 55 56
2 2 1
3 1 1
4 1
5 2 1 1
6 1
9 1
A1-3
Figure A4: Cumulative distribution function of beliefs across conditions
Figure A5: Cumulative distribution function of beliefs across conditions
A1-4
Table A3: The explanatory power of attitudes and beliefs for first period
contribution decisions
CONTROL CONTROL RISK RISK AMBIGUITY AMBIGUITY
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cˆ 0.771*** 0.769*** 0.827***
(0.0779) (0.102) (0.0835)
Belief 1.120*** 1.121*** 1.089***
(0.118) (0.129) (0.110)
Constant 3.783*** -0.936 3.053*** -1.739 2.668*** -0.692
(0.763) (1.210) (0.846) (1.216) (0.777) (1.044)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 0.629 0.608 0.493 0.566 0.628 0.628
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4: Regression results from random e↵ects Tobit. Dependent variable is
the per period individual contribution decisions.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
RISK 0.522 0.602
(1.071) (1.091)
AMBIGUITY -1.677 -1.598 -2.193**
(1.073) (1.093) (1.113)
cdevPosi,t 1 -0.0938** -0.149***
(0.0401) (0.0475)
cdevNegi,t 1 -0.201*** -0.235***
(0.0447) (0.0556)
HighMPCRi,t 1 0.595**
(0.298)
Period FE
Observations 1,800 1,620 1,080
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The results are reported at the means of the marginal e↵ects on the expected value of the
censored outcome.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A1-5
Figure A6: Screenshot belief elicitation
A1-6
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Experiment Instructions* 
* Only instructions for the AMBIGUITY treatment are presented here. Alterations of these were used for the RISK respectively 
CONTROL treatments, making sure to preserve as much resemblance as possible between the three instruction sets.  
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating! 
Please do not talk to other participants. 
 
General 
This is an experiment on decision making. You receive 4 Euro for showing up on time. During the experiment you can 
earn more money that will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment will last approximately 120 minutes. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and one of the 
experimenters will come to you and answer your questions privately. You are not allowed to communicate with any other 
participants during the experiment. If you do so, you shall be excluded from the experiment as well as from all payments. 
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in experimental points. At the end of the experiment, all points 
that you earn will be converted into Euro at the exchange rate announced at the beginning of each part. 
Anonymity 
You will learn neither during nor after the experiment, with whom you interact(ed) in the experiment. The other 
participants will neither during nor after the experiment learn how much you earn(ed). Your decisions will be anonymous. 
At the end of the experiment you will be asked to sign a receipt regarding your earnings which serves only as a proof for 
our sponsor. 
Means of help 
You will find a pen at your table which we ask that you, please, leave on the table when the experiment is over. While 
you make your decisions, a clock at the top of your computer screen will run down. This clock will inform you regarding 
how long we think that the decision time will be. However, if you need more time, you may exceed the limit. The input 
screens will not be dismissed once time runs out. However, the output/information screens (here you do not have to make 
any decisions) will be dismissed after time is up. 
Experiment 
The experiment consists of three parts. You will receive instructions for each part after the previous part has ended. These 
instructions will be read to you aloud. Then you will have an opportunity to study them on your own. The three parts are 
independent of each other. 
Decision colour choice 
Before we continue with the instructions, you will choose a decision colour – either yellow or white. The decision colour 
will be relevant later on, and we will describe in detail how it will be relevant. 
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Part 1 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 1 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 
1 points = 0.10 Euro 
The basic decision situation 
The basic decision situation will be explained to you in the following. Afterwards you will find some questions 
on the screen that will help you better understand the decision making environment.  
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 members. Each group member will be endowed with 20 points 
and has to decide on the allocation of these 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your private account or 
you can put them fully or partially into a group account. Each point you do not put into the group account will 
automatically remain in your private account. 
Your income from the private account: 
You will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. For example, if you put 20 points into 
your private account (and therefore do not put anything into the group account) your income will amount to 
exactly 20 points out of your private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from 
this account will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your private account. 
Your income from the group account: 
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you put into the group account. Similarly, you will also 
get a payoff from the other group members’ allocation into the group account. The individual income for each 
group member out of the group account will be either Option A or Option B: 
 
OPTION A 
Individual income from group account = 
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account u 0.3 
 
OR 
OPTION B 
Individual income from group account = 
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account u 0.9 
 
 
Option A and Option B become relevant with unknown probability; how the relevant option is 
determined will be explained below. 
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Examples 
If, for example, Option A is relevant and the sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account is 60 
points, then you and the other members of your group each earn 60×0.3=18 points out of the group account. If 
instead the four group members contribute a total of 10 points to the group account, you and the other members 
of your group each earn 10×0.3=3 points out of the group account.  
If, for example, Option B is relevant and the sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account is 60 
points, then you and the other members of your group each earn 60×0.9=54 points out of the group account. If 
instead the four group members contribute a total of 10 points to the group account, you and the other members 
of your group each earn 10×0.9=9 points out of the group account. 
Relevant option 
How do we determine whether Option A or Option B is relevant? Remember the decision colour choice in 
the beginning of this experiment. First, we determine the majority colour in your group. If three group members 
chose yellow, yellow is the group decision colour. If one chose yellow, white is the group decision colour, etc. If 
two group members chose yellow and two chose white, the decision colour is selected randomly. 
This opaque bag has already been filled with exactly 100 coloured chips before the experiment. These chips are 
either yellow or white. The distribution of the colours is unknown to you: A student assistant has randomly 
drawn 100 chips from a bigger bag that contained far more than 100 chips – only yellow and white ones. Thus, 
you do not know how many of the 100 chips are yellow or white. At the end of the experiment, one randomly 
selected participant will draw one chip without looking into the bag for each of the groups in this room, starting 
with group 1, group 2, group 3, … (each time returning the chip into the bag). If the colour of the drawn chip for 
your group does not match your group decision colour, Option A is relevant for your group; if the colour of the 
drawn chip matches your group decision colour, Option B is relevant for your group. You are allowed to inspect 
the content of the bag at the end of the experiment if you want to. 
Total income: 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the group account: 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account) 
EITHER 
 
 + Income from group account (= 0.3u sum of contributions to group account) 
if OPTION A is relevant (if chip colour ≠ group decision colour) 
OR 
+ Income from group account (= 0.9u sum of contributions to group account) 
if OPTION B is relevant (if chip colour = group decision colour) 
 
 
 = Total income  
   
Before we proceed, please try to solve the questions on your screen. If you want to compute something, you can 
use the Windows calculator by clicking on the calculation symbol on your screen.  
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Procedure of Part 1 
Part 1 includes the decision situation just described to you. The decisions in Part 1 will only be made once. 
On the first screen you will be informed about your group membership number. This number will be of 
relevance later on. If you have taken note of the number, please click “OK”. 
As you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal. You can put them into your private account or you can 
put them into the group account. Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions which we 
will refer to below as the unconditional contribution and the contribution table. 
x In the unconditional contribution case, you decide how many of the 20 points you want to put into the 
group account. Please insert your unconditional contribution in the respective box on your screen. You can 
insert integers only (e.g. numbers like 0, 1, 2…). Your contribution to the private account is determined 
automatically by the difference between 20 and your contribution to the group account. After you have 
chosen your unconditional contribution, please click “OK”.  
 
 
 
x On the next screen you are asked to fill in a contribution table. In the contribution table you indicate how 
much you want to contribute to the group account for each possible average contribution of the other 
group members (rounded to the nearest integer). Thus, you condition your contribution on the other group 
members’ average contributions. The contribution table looks as follows: 
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The numbers in each of the left columns are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group 
members to the group account. This means, they represent the average amounts of the other group members’ 
allocations into the group account. You simply have to insert into the input boxes how many points you will 
contribute to the group account. You have to make an entry into each input box. For example, you will have 
to indicate how much you contribute to the group account if the others contribute 0 points to the group account 
on average, how much you contribute if the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 points on average, etc. You can insert any 
whole number from 0 to 20 into each input box. You can of course insert the same number more than once. Once 
you have made an entry into each input box, please click “OK”.  
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled in their 
contribution table, a random mechanism will select one group member from every group. The contribution 
table will be the only payoff-relevant decision for the randomly determined participant in this part. The 
unconditional contribution will be the only payoff-relevant decision for the other three group members not 
selected by the random mechanism in this part. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will 
select you when you make your unconditional contribution and when you fill in the contribution table. You will 
therefore have to think carefully about both types of decisions because both can become relevant to you. 
Two examples should make this clear. 
Examples 
Example 1: Assume that Option A turns out to be relevant in the end (chip colour unmatches your group 
decision colour). Assume further that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant 
decision will be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for the other 
three group members. Assume they made unconditional contributions of 0, 3 and 6 points. The average rounded 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 3 points ((0+3+6)/3=3). 
x If you indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point to the group account, keeping 
20-1=19 in your private account, if the others contribute 3 points on average, then the total contribution 
to the group account is given by 0+3+6+1=10 points. All group members, therefore, earn 0.3×10=3 
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points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private account. You would then 
earn (20–1)+3=22 points. 
x If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 16 points to the group 
account, keeping 20-16=4 points in your private account, if the others contribute 3 points on average, 
then the total contribution of the group to the group account is given by 0+3+6+16=25 points. All group 
members therefore earn 0.3×25=7.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from 
the private account. You would then earn (20–16)+7.5=11.5 points. 
 
Assume instead that Option B turns out to be relevant in the end (chip colour matches your group decision 
colour) and again that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that your relevant decision will be 
your contribution table.  
x If you indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute 1 point to the group account, keeping 
20-1=19 in your private account, if the others contribute 3 points on average, then the total contribution 
to the group account is given by 0+3+6+1=10 points. All group members, therefore, earn 0.9×10=9 
points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private account. You would then 
earn (20–1)+9=28 points. 
x If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute 16 points to the group 
account, keeping 20-16=4 points in your private account, if the others contribute 3 points on average, 
then the total contribution of the group to the group account is given by 0+3+6+16=25 points. All group 
members therefore earn 0.9×25=22.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income from 
the private account. You would then earn (20–16)+22.5=26.5 points. 
 
Example 2: Assume that Option A turns out to be relevant in the end (chip colour unmatches group decision 
colour). Assume further that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that the unconditional 
contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and the other two unchosen group members. 
Assume that your unconditional contribution to the group account is 14 points and that of the other two unchosen 
group members is 10 and 18 points. The average unconditional contribution of you and the other group 
members, therefore, is 14 points (=(14+10+18)/3). 
x If the group member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she 
will contribute 3 points to the group account if the other three group members contribute, on average, 
14 points, then the total contribution to the group account is given by 14+10+18+3=45 points. All group 
members will therefore earn 0.3×45=13.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income 
from the private account. You would then earn (20-14)+13.5=19.5 points. 
x If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in her contribution table that she will 
contribute 18 points to the group account if the others contribute, on average, 14 points, then the total 
contribution to the group account is given by 14+10+18+18=60 points. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.3×60=18 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private 
account. You would then earn (20-14)+18=24 points. 
 
Assume instead that Option B turns out to be relevant in the end and again that the random mechanism did not 
select you, implying that the unconditional contribution is taken as the payoff-relevant decision for you and 
the other two unchosen group members.  
x If the group member whom the random mechanism selected indicates in her contribution table that she 
will contribute 3 points to the group account if the other three group members contribute, on average, 
14 points, then the total contribution to the group account is given by 14+10+18+3=45 points. All group 
members will therefore earn 0.9×45=40.5 points out of the group account plus their respective income 
from the private account. You would then earn (20-14)+40.5=46.5 points. 
x If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in her contribution table that she will 
contribute 18 points to the group account if the others contribute, on average, 14 points, then the total 
contribution to the group account is given by 14+10+18+18=60 points. All group members will 
therefore earn 0.9×60=54 points out of the group account plus their respective income from the private 
account. You would then earn (20-14)+54=60 points. 
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Random mechanism 
The random selection of the participants will be implemented as follows: One participant will be randomly 
select to throw a four-sided die – after all participants have made their unconditional contribution and have filled 
in their contribution table. The die throw will determine a number – 1, 2, 3, or 4. The thrown number will then be 
compared with the group membership number, which was shown to you on the first screen. If the thrown 
number equals your group membership number, then your contribution table is payoff-relevant for you and 
the unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant for the other three group members. Otherwise, your 
unconditional contribution is the relevant decision for you. 
After the end of Part 1 you will get the instructions for Part 2. How much your group members contributed, and 
how much you earned in Part 1 will be revealed at the end of the experiment. 
 
Part 2 
Exchange rate 
Any point earned in Part 2 will be converted into Euro at the following exchange rate: 
1 point = 0.04 Euro 
Periods 
The second part of the experiment will last 10 periods. The 10 periods are identical. You are randomly 
matched anew into groups of 4 at the beginning of this part. The group composition does not change over the 
10 periods. That means your group consists of the same people in all 10 periods. You may now have a new 
group decision colour, depending on the individual colour choices of your group members at the beginning of 
the experiment. Again, the majority within the group determines the decision colour. Each group member 
receives a random identification number from 1 to 4. This number will also remain fixed in all 10 periods. 
The basic decision situation 
The basic decision situation is the same as the one described in the instructions for the previous part. In every 
period, each member of the group has to decide upon the allocation of the 20 points. You can put these 20 points 
into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a group account. Each point you do not 
invest into the group account is automatically placed into your private account. The only difference to the first 
part is that you can only provide an unconditional contribution. There is no contribution table in this part. Every 
member’s payoff in each period depends on all members’ unconditional contribution decisions. 
Your income from the private account: 
As in Part 1, you will earn one point for each point you put into your private account. No one except you earns 
something from your private account. 
Your income from the group account: 
The per period individual income for each group member out of the group account will be either Option A or 
Option B as in Part 1: 
OPTION A 
Individual income from group account = 
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Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account u 0.3 
 
OR 
OPTION B 
Individual income from group account = 
Sum of all group members’ contributions to the group account u 0.9 
 
 
Option A and Option B become relevant with unknown probability; how the relevant option is 
determined exactly will be explained below. 
 
Total income: 
Your per period total income is determined in the same way as in Part 1: 
   
 Income from your private account (= 20 – contribution to group account) 
EITHER 
 
 + Income from group account (= 0.3u sum of contributions to group account) 
if OPTION A is relevant 
OR 
+ Income from group account (= 0.9u sum of contributions to group account) 
if OPTION B is relevant 
 
 
 = Total income  
   
 
The decision screen, which you will see in every period, looks like this: 
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As you can see, there is no conditional contribution table. You only need to decide on your unconditional 
contribution in every period. At the end of every period, each participant receives feedback on the results of the 
period, including the individual contributions made by each group member, the total amount contributed to the 
group account, and the participant’s own earnings from the period. 
Option A or B? 
These 10 opaque bags have already been filled with exactly 100 coloured chips before the experiment and 
labelled Period 1, Period 2, Period 3, …, Period 10. These chips in the bags are either yellow or white. The 
distribution of the colours is unknown to you: A student assistant has randomly drawn 100 chips for each bag 
from a bigger bag that contained far more than 100 chips – only yellow and white ones. Thus, you do not know 
how many of the 100 chips in each bag are yellow or white. At the end of every period, one randomly selected 
participant will draw one chip from the appropriate bag (bag “Period 1” after period 1, bag “Period 2” after 
period 2 ,…) without looking into the bag for each of the groups in this room, starting with group 1, group 2, 
group 3, … (each time returning the chip into the bag). If the colour of the drawn chip for your group does not 
match your group decision colour, Option A is relevant for your group; if the colour of the drawn chip matches 
your group decision colour, Option B is relevant for your group. You are allowed to inspect the content of the 
bag at the end of the experiment if you want to. 
At the end of every period, each participant receives feedback on the results of the period, including the 
individual contributions made by each group member, the total amount contributed to the group account, the 
relevant option (A or B) and the participant’s own earnings from the period. 
Your earnings from Part 2 will be determined by the sum of earnings from all 10 periods. 
At the end of part 2, we will ask you to choose a colour. This colour will later be used in part 3.   
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Part 3 
Part 3 consists of two sub-parts: Part 3a and Part 3b. All payoffs are stated in Euro. Either Part 3a or Part 3b is 
paid out for real. 
Part 3 is composed of two sets of individual decision problems, and they are presented on two subsequent 
screens. You are not matched to any person; you decide for yourself. In each of those 40decisions you can chose 
between two alternatives. Your decision is valid only after you have reached a decision for all problems on one 
screen and have clicked on the OK-button at the bottom of the screen. Take enough time for your decisions, 
because one of your choices will determine your payoff in Part 3, as we describe below.   
The first 20 decisions (Part 3a) concern Bag A. Bag A is filled with 100 chips. Exactly 50 chips are red, and 
50 chips are blue. In the 20 decisions you will have to decide whether you want to bet on the draw from the bag 
(Option X) or take an increasing amount of money for sure (independent of the draw) (Option Y).  
If part 3a is payoff-relevant, a randomly selected participant will blindly draw a chip out of the opaque bag A, at 
the end of Part 3. If you have chosen Option X for the payoff-relevant decision problem, and the colour of 
the chip matches your personal decision colour for Part 3, you receive 10 Euro. If instead you have chosen 
Option X and the colour does not match your personal decision colour for Part 3, you receive nothing. If 
you have chosen Option Y, you will receive the corresponding sure payoff, independently of the colour 
drawn. This is how Part 3a will look like: 
 
The second 20 decisions (Part 3b) concern Bag B. Bag B is filled with 100 chips. The chips are either red or 
blue. The distribution of the colours is unknown to you: A student assistant has randomly drawn 100 chips 
from a bigger bag that contained far more than 100 chips – only red and blue ones. Bag B was filled with 100 
chips just before this session began. Thus, you do not know how many of the 100 chips are red or blue. In the 
20 decisions you will have to decide whether you want to bet on the draw from the bag (Alternative X) or take 
an increasing amount of money for sure (independent of the draw) (Alternative Y).  
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If part 3b is payoff-relevant, a randomly selected participant will blindly draw a chip out of the opaque bag B at 
the end of Part 3. If you have chosen Option X for the payoff-relevant decision problem, and the colour of 
the chip matches your personal decision colour for Part 3, you receive 10 Euro. If instead you have chosen 
Option X and the colour does not match your personal decision colour for Part 3, you receive nothing. If 
you have chosen Option Y, you will receive the corresponding for sure payoff independently of the draw. 
This is how Part 3b will look like.  
 
 
 
If you want to perform calculations, just click on the calculator symbol at the bottom right area of the screen, 
which will start the Windows calculator (Note: be aware of the order of operations, multiplication before 
addition!). 
Profit from Part 3 
Your profit will be determined as follows: When all participants have completed the 40 decisions, a randomly 
selected participant will blindly draw a card from a deck of 40 cards. The cards are numbered 1 to 40. The 
number on the drawn card determines which of the 40 decision problems is payoff-relevant (it determines 
indirectly whether it is Part 3a or Part 3b). Then, he or she draws one chip from either Bag A (if the number is 
between 1 and 20) or Bag B (if the number is between 21 and 40).  
If you have chosen Alternative Y you receive the sure outcome. If you have chosen alternative X, you receive 10 
or 0 depending on whether your personal decision colour matches the drawn chip from the relevant bag. 
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Examples 
For example, imagine that decision number 4 is chosen by the card draw and that you preferred alternative X. 
Then the randomly selected participant draws one chip to determine one of the two outcomes of alternative X. If 
your decision colour matches the colour drawn, you receive 10 Euro (with a probability of 50%), if not you 
receive nothing (with a probability of 50%) as payoff for Part 3. If you instead had preferred alternative Y you 
would have got 2 Euro as payoff for Part 3, independently of your decision colour. 
Imagine instead that the number on the card corresponds to decision number 27 and that you preferred 
alternative X. The randomly selected participant draws one chip to determine the outcome. Again, if your 
decision colour matches the colour drawn, you receive 10 Euro (with an unknown probability), if not you receive 
nothing (with an unknown probability). If you instead had preferred alternative Y you would have got 3.5 Euro 
as payoff for Part 3, independently of your decision colour. 
All 40 decisions in Part 3 are made only once. At the end of Part 3, you will be asked a number of questions. 
Remember, all answers in our experiment remain anonymous. After you have completed the questionnaire page 
on the screen, the experiment ends. You will be informed about your earnings in each of the three parts of the 
experiment, and will receive your payoff from the experiment individually and in cash. 
 
 
 
 
 
